COMMENTS

A Substantive Test For Sherman Act
Plurality: Applications for Professional
Sports Leagues
The first two sections of the Sherman Act create a fundamental distinction between plural and unilateral business conduct. Section 1 prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States."' Section 2 punishes "[e]very person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States."2 Unilateral
conduct by a single entity can be found illegal under section 2, but
can never be found illegal under section 1.
This difference in treatment reflects distinct concerns about
the dangers to competition that inhere in plural and unilateral
conduct. Section I prohibits certain concerted actions that would
restrain trade. Section 2 does not prohibit all unilateral actions
that would restrain trade; instead, it prohibits only actions that are
or threaten to become monopolistic. Because the two sections prohibit different kinds of conduct, the determination of plurality
often governs the legal standards applied to business conduct. How
defendants are characterized in number thus can greatly affect
their potential antitrust liability.
Until recently, the plurality of actors necessary to trigger scrutiny under section 1 could be found if more than one legally distinct entity participated in the alleged violation. Yet, in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,3 the Supreme Court
held that a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed
as a single enterprise for Sherman Act purposes, and are incapable

-

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
2 Id. § 2.
3 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
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of conspiring to violate section 1. The Court found single-entity
status appropriate because a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have identical economic interests.5 Under this standard, joint
action by separate firms might be considered unilateral and immune from section 1 even though the firms are not commonly
owned.
This standard may change the antitrust consequences of joint
activities by firms with similar interests. One such activity is the
"joint venture," which may comprise cooperative activity at the
production or marketing stage. Another more complicated form is
the professional sports league. A sports league brings together several legally distinct and independently owned firms (the individual
clubs) to create a single product: sporting events. In an obvious
sense, the individual clubs are on-field rivals and have divergent
interests. But because the clubs must cooperate to produce the
league product, they have a common interest in collective decisions
about the way to make the product. Clubs are also economically
interdependent because they agree to share certain revenues. After
Copperweld, the unity of interest among clubs in a league, which
varies in extent according to the terms of the particular league
agreement, might make the clubs a single entity for section 1
purposes.
This comment argues that Copperweld, by adopting a new approach to the plurality question, compels a fresh attempt to categorize joint firm conduct as either unilateral or concerted. Because
sports leagues present a particularly difficult example of that broad
problem, this comment examines their status in light of Copperweld. It concludes that some forms of coordinated conduct
among the member clubs of a professional sports league should be
treated as unilateral, while other forms should be treated as concerted and fully subject to section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Part I examines Copperweld and proposes a new approach to
the plurality issue based on its reasoning. The proposed test looks
to the substantive economic interests of the entities involved to
determine whether a plurality of actors exists. Part II briefly outlines the structure of sports leagues. Part III critically reviews current approaches to the plurality characterization of sports leagues,
arguing that these approaches do not survive Copperweld. Part IV
applies the proposed plurality test to professional sports leagues by
Id. at 2745.
5 Id. at 2742.
4
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examining three types of league decisions that might be challenged
on antitrust grounds.
I.

A

SUBSTANTIVE TEST FOR SHERMAN ACT PLURALITY

In Copperweld, a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary
agreed to try to exclude one of the subsidiary's competitors from
the market.' In a flat rejection of the "intraenterprise conspiracy"
doctrine, the Supreme Court held that section 1 of the Sherman
Act does not extend to agreements between commonly owned corporations. 7 In the Court's view, a parent and its subsidiary are a
single enterprise with "a complete unity of interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate; their general corporate actions
are guided or determined not by two separate corporate consciousnesses, but one. They are not unlike a multiple team of horses
drawing a vehicle under the control of a single driver."8 In arriving
at this view, the Court set out an important new standard for determining plurality under the Sherman Act.9
6 Id. at 2735.
7 The "intraenterprise
conspiracy" doctrine, to which the Supreme Court gave
credence at times, enabled courts to find a section 1 conspiracy between commonly owned
entities, such as a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers,
Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968). Most courts stopped short of
finding conspiracy between other legally distinct but affiliated entities, such as a corporation
and its officers. See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416
F.2d 71, 82-83 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970). On the doctrine generally,
see LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 114 (1977); Areeda, IntraenterpriseConspiracy in Decline, 97 HARv. L. REv. 451 (1983); Handler & Smart, The
Present Status of the IntracorporateConspiracyDoctrine, 3 CARDozo L. REv. 23, 73 (1981);
McQuade, Conspiracy,Multicorporate Enterprises,and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 41
VA. L. Rav. 183 (1955); Note, "Conspiring Entities" Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
95 HARv. L. REv. 661 (1982).
s 104 S. Ct. at 2742.
' The plurality determination itself addresses only a threshold issue: it classifies the
parties involved, for antitrust purposes, as belonging to one single entity or as each standing
on its own, independent and apart from others. This determination is crucial, however, because it affects the substantive rules of liability to be applied. Two examples illustrate this
point. First, in cases under section 1-which applies only to concerted conduct-courts
often apply per se rules to invalidate agreements, such as price fixing between horizontal
competitors, that are sufficiently anticompetitive to offend the Sherman Act regardless of
any possible justification for their use. See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393
U.S. 333 (1969); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). These per se
rules do not apply to violations of section 2, which governs unilateral conduct.
Second, section 2 requires that the firm's conduct threaten monopolization in order to
be illegal; this in turn requires some degree of actual or potential market domination by the
defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966). Section 1 has
no such requirement, and conspiring firms may violate that section even though their market power is negligible.
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The Copperweld Test

The Copperweld Court refused to rest its determination of
plurality on the number of legal persons involved. The Court explained that the formal structure of a business has little to do with
the purposes of the Sherman Act. A business structure may be
adopted, for example, to obtain tax advantages or to improve the
effectiveness of management-considerations unrelated to the
firm's potential to restrain trade. 10 The Court instead looked to the
substance of the arrangement to determine whether classifying it
as plural would further the purposes of section 1. In doing so, the
Court developed an analysis that applies to all coordinated conduct, regardless of the formal legal relationship of the actors.
The Court began with the premise that Congress intended the
Sherman Act to require different standards of scrutiny for plural
and unilateral actions. This can be seen in the structure of the Act:
unilateral conduct is illegal only if it threatens monopolization of a
market, even though it may have lesser anticompetitive effects."
Plural conduct, on the other hand, is illegal if its anticompetitive
effects outweigh its procompetitive benefits, even if the conduct
poses no danger of monopolization."2
The Court explained that Congress decided to treat concerted
conduct more sternly than unilateral conduct because concerted
conduct is especially "fraught with anticompetitive risk."' 3 Although the behavior of a single firm in the marketplace can sometimes restrain trade and reduce competition, those effects are often
merely the natural result of the firm's efforts to maximize its com10 Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2743.
"

Id. at 2740. Section 2 is not limited solely to unilateral conduct; it also reaches "con-

spiracies to monopolize." See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). In Copperweld, the Supreme Court acknowledged this, but explained that the essential difference between sections 1 and 2 is that
section 1 reaches only plural conduct. 104 S. Ct. at 2740 n.13.
12 This is not to say that market power is irrelevant to the determination of whether
plural activity violates section 1. For example, tying arrangements are per se illegal if the
defendant's share of the market for the tying product gives it "sufficient economic power"
with respect to that product to" 'appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the
tied product.'" Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Co., 394 U.S. 495, 499 (1969)
(quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958)).
Outside of the tying context, however, the Court in Copperweld admitted that the difference in the standards applied to unilateral and plural conduct leaves a "gap" in the Sherman Act's prohibition of unreasonable restraints of trade. The same degree of restraint may
be effected by a combination of firms or by a single firm which possesses equivalent market
power. Yet the restraint would be subject to judicial scrutiny only in the first case. See 104
S. Ct. at 2744.
'3 104 S. Ct. at 2741.
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petitiveness in the marketplace. 14 The firm's efforts are valuable,
and may compensate for any anticompetitive side effects. Concerted conduct, on the other hand, is capable of anticompetitive
effects without any compensating efficiencies. In addition, concerted activity necessarily diminishes the number of independent
economic actors, thereby "depriv[ing] the marketplace of the independent centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes and
demands. . . [and] reduc[ing] the diverse directions in which economic power is aimed.' 1 5 The Court therefore found that, to effectuate Congress's purpose, conduct should be deemed unilateral
when it is unlikely to reduce the number and diversity of centers of
economic power in the marketplace, and when its beneficial efficiencies are highly likely to outweigh its anticompetitive effects.
Conduct should be considered plural when it has the opposite
6
effects.'
The Court concluded that coordinated conduct meets the unilateral paradigm when the actors exhibit a preexistent and relatively permanent unity of economic interest. The Court drew an
analogy to agreements among the officers or unincorporated divisions of a corporation, which do not "raise the antitrust dangers
that § 1 was designed to police" because the parties "are not...
pursuing separate economic interests.' 7 Instead those agreements
serve to promote competition by allowing the agreeing parties to
maximize the efficiency of the entire operation.' 8 The Court stated
that a "business enterprise should be free to structure itself in
ways that serve efficiency of control, economy of operations, and
other factors dictated by business judgment without increasing its
exposure to antitrust liability."' 9
Under this unity-of-interest test, the Court held that agreements between a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary fall
outside the scope of section 1. The coordinated acts of these firms
do not "suddenly bring together economic power that was previously pursuing divergent goals. '2 0 Because the parent and the subsidiary have "a complete unity of interest" that is already established at the time of any subsequent coordinated activity, their
joint conduct is likely to be motivated by an intent to create effi-

, Id. at 2740 & n.14.
15Id. at 2741.
16 Id. at 2740-41.
17 Id. at 2741-42.
18 Id.

19Id. at 2743.
20 Id. at 2741.
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ciencies rather than by an intent to restrain trade.2
On the other hand, the Court made clear that conduct is plural when the actors involved do not have a preexistent unity of
economic interest. At four points in the opinion the Court reiterated that the identifying characteristic of concerted conduct is a
sudden joining of sources of economic power that previously pursued divergent goals.2 2 It is not sufficient to escape section 1 scrutiny that the parties to the coordinated activity may coincidentally
share an identical economic interest in the results of some particular coordinated activity. The identity of interest must be more permanent. 23 It is the preexistence and stability of this unity of interest that increases the probability that the net effect of the
coordinated conduct will be to create procompetitive and beneficial
efficiencies, rather than merely to effectuate an anticompetitive restraint of trade.
B.

A Proposed Interpretation

In Copperweld, the Supreme Court decided only the narrow
question of whether a parent corporation and its wholly owned
subsidiary are separate entities that can conspire to violate the
Sherman Act. Yet the cooperation between a parent and its subsidiary is only one instance of the broader relationship between coordinated activity and competition. The ability to cooperate underlies the ability to compete. Nearly all competitive entities are
formed by separate individuals who join together in coordinated
activity. 24 An engineer and a salesman may form a partnership to
make and sell computers, two officers of a firm may agree on the
firm's business strategy, or two divisions of a corporation may cooperate to develop a new product. To classify such cooperation as
unilateral or plural is to address the critical question of when cooperation becomes anticompetitive. Copperweld addresses this larger
problem by developing an approach to plurality that applies
outside the parent-subsidiary situation.
The Court described two categories of coordinated activity
within antitrust law: unilateral and concerted. The difference between the two turns on whether the cooperating parties share a
preexistent unity of economic interest. But the Court's opinion in
Copperweld left two important questions unresolved. First, the

22

Id. at 2742.
Id. at 2741-42.

23

Id.

21

at 2742 (a parent and subsidiary "always" have unity of purpose).

24 See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox 264-67 (1978).
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Court did not decide whether unity of economic interest can exist
in the absence of common ownership.2 5 Second, the Court did not
analyze forms of business organization that exhibit varying degrees
of unity of economic interest, and thus fall somewhere along the
continuum between the two paradigms. Nevertheless, the approach
developed by the Court in Copperweld may be used to address
these two questions.
First, the Court's analysis suggests that a joint business enterprise may display a unity of economic interest even without an
ownership relation among the parties to the enterprise. One example is an agreement among the shareholders of a corporation. No
shareholder owns any other shareholder, yet the agreement would
not be subject to scrutiny under section 1 because the shareholders
have unity of economic interest with regard to the operations of
the corporation. 6
Another example of such an enterprise is the traditional partnership. Indeed, the Court itself classified as unilateral the coordinated conduct of partners in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society17 There the Court explained that "the partnership is regarded as a single firm competing with other sellers in the market"
because the partners "pool their capital and share the risks of loss
25 The Court expressly declined to consider "under what circumstances, if any, a parent may be liable for conspiring with an affiliated corporation it does not completely own."
104 S. Ct. at 2740. Yet some statements in Copperweld might be taken to suggest that
parties to concerted action can be considered a single entity only when one party is able to
control the other. See Note, The Long Awaited Death Knell of the IntraenterpriseDoctrine, 30 ViL. L. Ray. 521, 564 (1985) (suggesting that Copperweld confers single-entity
status to relationships of less-than-complete ownership if the parent corporation can "exert
full control" over the subsidiary). For example, the Court noted that a parent ultimately
controls its wholly owned subsidiary, 104 S. Ct. at 2742, even though it delegates some degree of managerial discretion to the subsidiary. However, the Court expressly rejected the
so-called "single entity" test, which would have made the plurality determination turn on
the amount of control actually exercised by the parent over the subsidiary. Id. at 2742 n.18.
In addition, if one party's control over the other were dispositive of the plurality question,
agreements between coordinate officers or divisions of a firm would be plural conduct. Such
a finding would conflict with the Court's rejection of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine.
Thus, rather than emphasizing control, Copperweld makes clear that the essential factor in
the plurality determination is the degree of unity of economic interest among the parties to
the activity. Id. at 2741-43. This does not mean that one party's ability to control the other
is irrelevant. Certainly the decisionmaking structure of a joint business enterprise will often
reflect its degree of unity of economic interest since parties to coordinated conduct will
usually cede decisionmaking power to one another only when the two share identical economic interests.
26 Cf. Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 763 F.2d 1482, 1496 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding
that employees are incapable of conspiring among themselves or with their firm in violation
of section 1 unless they are acting outside the interests of the firm for their own interests).
2-7457 U.S. 332 (1982).
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as well as the opportunities for profit."2 8 Partners have a unity of
economic interest because their preexistent partnership agreement
provides that the consequences of their economic conduct will affect each of them in substantially the same way. Any subsequent
coordinated activity among partners which relates to the conduct
of the partnership must therefore be regarded as unilateral.
These examples suggest that parties to coordinated conduct
have a unity of economic interest whenever a relatively permanent
relationship exists that fixes the proportions in which they share in
the profits and losses of their joint conduct. 2 Under such a relationship, the parties to the enterprise have identical economic interests in the outcome of later coordinated decisions about the
joint enterprise, thus indicating that the parties' conduct is
30
unilateral.
This definition of "unity of interest" best serves the purpose
of the plurality requirement as it was explained in Copperweld.
Under an agreement fixing the proportions of the parties' returns,
each party's gain or loss is tied solely to the overall profitability of
Id. at 356. The Second Circuit took the same position in Konik v. Champlain Valley
Physicians Hosp., 733 F.2d 1007, 1012 n.3 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 253 (1984),
where it stated that a professional corporation of anesthesiologists should be regarded as a
single entity because its members shared the risk of gain or loss.
2'The original agreement or arrangement which establishes unity of economic interest
among the parties to a joint enterprise will always be subject to section 1 scrutiny. Because
the agreement establishes a relationship between parties that eliminates plurality between
them, the agreement must be viewed as similar to a merger. See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at
2745 ("A corporation's initial acquisition of control will always be subject to scrutiny under
§ 1 of the Sherman Act.").
3 For example, if A and B have a preexistent arrangement such that A's profits are
always proportional to B's, then with any incremental change in A's profits, B's profits will
change proportionally. The parties to such an agreement have identical economic interests
even though its terms give them unequal shares of net profit. For example, the parties may
agree to split net profits in a given ratio, say 60/40. Since the profit-maximizing output is
achieved where marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal cost (MC), see R. LEFTWiCH & R.
ECKERT, THE PRICE SYSTEM AND REsouRcE ALLOCATION 289 (8th ed. 1982), partner A sees
the optimal output where .6(MC) equals .6(MR), or MC = MR. Likewise, B sees the optimal output where .4(MC) equals .4(MR), which is also where MC = MR. Thus, A and B
have identical economic interests in production decisions because they will both seek to
follow a course of action which will maximize the net profits of the partnership.
The arrangement described above is distinguishable from a venture in which A and B
split the cost of producing a product, but agree to sell it in exclusive territories. See, e.g.,
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). Such a venture is not truly joint, because each party stands to make proportionally variable profits. The different demand
schedules in the two markets determine different levels of marginal return for any given
quantity of output. Thus, although A and B share the same marginal cost schedule, the fact
that they face different marginal revenue schedules leads each of them to a different optimal
output when they attempt to equate MC and MR.
28
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the joint activity. 3 1 This will lead the parties to structure their coordinated conduct on the basis of the competitiveness of the whole
operation. While there may be some risk that the parties will restrain competition through their joint conduct, just as there is in a
parent-subsidiary arrangement, the ability of such parties to structure their business free of section 1 carries net procompetitive benefits. Like parties to a common ownership or partnership arrangement, parties to this kind of agreement are best described as a
single competitor in the marketplace.3 2
The Court's approach in Copperweld also provides a basis for
analyzing coordinated conduct within cooperative business organizations, such as joint ventures or sports leagues, that exhibit a
unity of economic interest with respect to some aspects of their
operations, but not with respect to others. These organizations fall
somewhere along the continuum between the two categories of coordinated activity identified in Copperweld. The Court's reasoning
in Copperweld suggests that such enterprises should be treated as
single entities for those activities in which they share a preexistent
unity of economic interest, but not for activities in which that
unity is lacking. Thus, if a business organization has an arrangement distributing the economic effects of its conduct to its members in fixed proportions, any coordinated decision concerning that
conduct should be viewed as unilateral. Cooperation among the
same members over matters falling outside the preexistent arrangement should be viewed as concerted and subject to scrutiny

31 See supra note 30. This line of reasoning distinguishes true partnership behavior
from that of a traditional cartel. When a cartel undertakes to set prices above the competitive level, all participants will share an interest in raising prices, because all participants
expect to experience increased profits. However, the interests of the cartel members will not
be identical. Because neither costs nor revenues are divided among the members in fixed
proportions, the participants will have no incentive to work together to maximize the profits
of the group as a whole. Moreover, participants in a traditional cartel lack a preexistent
agreement which would ensure unity of economic interest over a series of coordinated economic decisions and not just with respect to the decision to fix prices.
Because a cartel lacks unity of economic interest as defined in Copperweld, the approach to the section 1 plurality determination suggested in this comment will have no immunizing effect on the kinds of cartel agreements traditionally subjected to section 1. See,
e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 5 (1979) (organization of composers that
issued blanket license for members' work and distributed royalties in accordance with nature and amount of use of their work); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 352 (1967)
(joint licensing agreement with territorial divisions); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593, 595-96 (1951) (territorial allocation by partially integrated firms); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 4 (1945) (members of news collection organization
pay to use news pooled by other members). None of these cases involved preexistent agreements in which the parties had agreed to share profits and losses in fixed proportions.
32 See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2740-44.
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under section 1.11
Firms that are part of a joint venture, for example, have an
identity of interest within the parameters of the venture where its
terms specify their proportional shares in the profits and losses of
their joint actions.3 4 Their preexistent relationship fixes their economic interests with regard to joint decisions; they will seek to
maximize the common profits of their joint action. Once in such a
relationship, the parties essentially act as one decisionmaking unit,
and should be regarded as a single enterprise under the Copperweld test.3 5 But to the extent their cooperative decisions operate on profits not subject to the agreement, the parties fall under
the plural paradigm.
A professional sports league presents a more complicated mixture of unilateral and concerted conduct. The league constitution
defines the arrangement among the individual clubs that establishes their economic interests with respect to league decisions.

3 The idea of treating a business organization as a single entity for some purposes but
not for others is not new. Advocates of the "potential economic competition" test for sports
league plurality assert that league conduct should be viewed as concerted when it affects
matters involving potential economic competition among clubs, and as unilateral when such
potential competition is not implicated. See infra notes 67-76 and accompanying text. Also,
at least one court has suggested that two corporations could be viewed as a single entity
with respect to a joint project to make a new product if they had agreed to "'share the risks
of loss as well as the opportunities for profit,'" although presumably they would be viewed
as separate entities for all other purposes. Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705
F.2d 1030, 1053 (9th Cir.) (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332,
356 (1982)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983). Other courts have suggested that employees
may conspire with one another or with their firm where they are acting outside the interests
of the firm for their own interests. Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 763 F.2d 1482, 1496
(3d Cir. 1985); Greenville Pub. Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 399-400 (4th Cir.
1974); see also Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act: The Use and Abuse of Section 1 to Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry, 32 UCLA L. REv. 219, 253-54 (1985)
(sports leagues may be single entities for some purposes and not for others).
34 The concept of a joint venture discussed here does not encompass cartel arrangements that have sometimes been condemned by courts under the label "joint venture." The
proposed test gives section 1 immunity only to activities fashioned in the same manner as a
traditional joint venture or partnership-an undertaking in which the parties pool their capital for a limited purpose and share proportionally in the prospects for profit and loss. See
Tiffany Constr. Co. v. Hancock & Kelley Constr. Co., 24 Ariz. App. 504, 539 P.2d 978 (1975);
Rivett v. Nelson, 158 Cal. App. 2d 268, 322 P.2d 515 (1958); Comment, Joint Venture or
Partnership,18 FORDHAM L. REV. 114, 118, 123 (1949). The Uniform Partnership Act states
that an agreement to share gross returns is not itself a distinguishing feature of a partnership, whereas an agreement to share profits may be. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7(3-4), 6
U.L.A. 38 (1914). The Supreme Court has confronted many joint production arrangements
that did not exhibit the characteristics of a traditional joint venture or a partnership. See
supra note 31 and cases cited there. Although such arrangements were labeled "joint ventures," the analysis of those cases is not affected by the test proposed here.
3' See supra note 30.
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Yet, because the terms of these constitutions vary from league to
league, and because it is sometimes difficult to pinpoint whether
the product (sporting events) is produced by the individual clubs
or by the league as a whole, these arrangements offer an excellent
hard case for applying the substantive plurality test. The remainder of the comment is devoted to applying the Copperweld test to
professional sports leagues.

II.

THE STRUCTURE OF SPORTS LEAGUES

All professional sports leagues exhibit a dual financial and
decisionmaking structure. On the one hand, clubs are separately
owned businesses with a wide degree of autonomy in day-to-day
operations, and they bear the economic consequences of their individual decisions in gate revenues and operating costs. On the other
hand, many critical league decisions are made collectively, and the
economic consequences of those decisions are often distributed
among the clubs in the form of shared revenues.
Leagues have this dual structure because the nature of consumer demand for professional sports requires some aspects of
league production to be undertaken collectively and others independently. On the one hand, some degree of collective decisionmaking is necessary for clubs in a league to coordinate a championship race. Otherwise leagues would present nothing more than a
random series of contests between separate clubs.3 6 On the other
hand, fan loyalty to a club depends on the perception that the club
competes independently against other clubs-a perception that
would be lacking if all clubs were commonly owned.37 Thus, some
aspects of the demand for the professional sports product, such as
the interest in a championship, require cooperation; other aspects,
such as fan loyalty, require competition. In short, the nature of the
sports league's product dictates that the league neither be fully integrated as one firm, nor divided into completely isolated firms.
3' Obviously, fans are more interested in the outcome of games that have immediate
consequences for the championship. Indeed, two commentators have argued that the two
most important influences on fan attendance are the population of the franchise location
and the team's standing in the league championship race. J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLrrZ, BASEBALL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 72-73 (1981); see also HENRY DEMMERT, THE ECONOMICS
OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 11-15 (1973).
1 See Antitrust Policy and ProfessionalSports: Oversight Hearings on H.R. 823, H.R.
3287 and H.R. 6467 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies & Commercial Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 290-91 (1982) (NFL statement) (arguing
that consolidated ownership of all league clubs would injure local fan identification) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Policy and Professional Sports].
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Sports leagues accommodate these conflicting needs for unity
and autonomy through contractual integration among their member clubs. These contracts allocate decisionmaking authority between individual clubs and the collective league organization.
Through revenue-sharing agreements, they also create a financial
structure of economic interdependence. This section explains how
the legal, organizational, and financial structures of professional
sports leagues often give clubs similar substantive interests in
league decisions.
A.

Legal Structure

A professional sports league is not an independent legal entity,
but instead consists of a set of contractual relationships among individual clubs. A sports league is typically an unincorporated association, 38 which at common law lacks the independent legal existence necessary to enter into contracts or own property, and its
assets and liabilities are only those of its individual members.3 9
Nonetheless, common law doctrine" and cases dealing specifically
with sports leagues 41 recognize that the association's constitution
and by-laws constitute a legally enforceable contract among the
members of the league. These compacts may include promises to
participate in league games under league rules, to share revenues
in a certain manner, not to invade another team's territory, and to
abide by the decisionmaking processes set forth in the
constitution.
Clubs themselves take a variety of legal forms. They have been
organized as closely held corporations, subchapter S corporations,
publicly held corporations, ordinary partnerships, limited partnerships, and sole proprietorships. 42 Regardless of their legal form, the
38 See, e.g., NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONST. & BY-LAws 9 (1976) ("An Unincorporated Association Not for Profit"); UNITED' STATES FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONST., at title page
(1982) (same).
39 HOWARD OLECK, NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, & AssocIATIONS §§ 50,
52 (4th ed. 1980); see, e.g., Krall v. Light, 240 Mo. App. 480, 489, 210 S.W.2d 739, 745
(1948).
40 See, e.g., Savoca Masonry Co. v. Homes & Son Constr. Co., 112 Ariz. 392, 395, 542
P.2d 817, 820 (1975); Libby v. Perry, 311 A.2d 527, 532 (Me. 1973).
41 See, e.g., Professional Sports, Ltd. v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, Ltd. Partnership, 373 F. Supp. 946, 950 (W.D. Tex. 1974); Riko Enters. v. Seattle Supersonics Corp., 357
F. Supp. 521, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 321 (E.D. Pa.
1953).
42 See NASL v. NFL, 505 F. Supp. 659, 662-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (chart showing forms of
ownership of football and soccer teams), revd, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1074 (1982); J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLITz, supra note 36, at 83-84 (same for ownership of
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salient feature of all clubs is that each one is owned and operated
separately from any other club in the same league.43
B. Organizational Structure
League constitutions divide league operations into three categories: activities controlled primarily by the individual clubs, activities controlled by the collective decisions of the league, and activities governed by a combination of league and club decisions.
League agreements typically maintain club autonomy in those aspects of the club's activity which resemble the day-to-day operation of a business. Each club selects and deals with personnel individually within the confines of league-approved contracts and
player-trading rules." In some leagues, the club chooses its playing
location within the territory allocated by the league and negotiates
its own stadium lease. A club usually has exclusive power to sell
broadcast rights for home games to be shown within its own territory, and, in one league, all rights to broadcast pre-season games. 46
baseball teams).

43 See, e.g., UNITED STATES FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONST. art. IX,

§

9.1(a) (1982) (clubs

must be separately owned).
" Restraints on a club's power to negotiate with individual players are found both in
the club's contract with the player and in agreements among clubs. Most leagues use standardized contracts for all players. These contracts are the product of agreement between the
clubs as a group and the players' collective bargaining unit. See generally J. WEISTART & C.
LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS §§ 6.01-.11 (1979 & Supp. 1985) (describing the development
of collective bargaining in professional sports). Most contracts contain clauses creating in
the club an option to renew the player's contract at the end of its term or to assign the
contract to another team either by trade or sale. See id. §§ 3.12-.13.
Restraints on negotiation not included in club-player contracts include the player draft
and the "no tampering" rule. Clubs agree, through a draft, to give each club the exclusive
right to negotiate with certain new players. Once a player has signed with a club, league bylaws usually prohibit other clubs from "tampering" or negotiating with him. Id. § 5.03(b)(c).
.. In major league baseball, clubs control all rights to regular season games that are not
sold as part of the league network television and radio agreements. The league controls the
rights to national telecasts of the regular season, playoff, and World Series games. Clubs can
also prevent the broadcast within their territory of another club's game if that broadcast is
not part of the league package. See SELECT COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, INQUIRY INTO
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, H.R. REP. No. 1786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as INQUIRY INTO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS]; J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLITz, supra note 36, at
66; see also Horwitz, Sports Broadcasting,in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 276-79
(R. Noll ed. 1974). Few clubs have developed markets for non-network broadcasting of
games beyond their own territories, J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLrrz, supra note 36, at 66, but
there is some indication that more clubs are doing so. See Baseball 1983, BROADCASTING,
Feb. 28, 1983, at 54 (clubs developing joint "superchannel ventures").
In professional football, clubs have exclusive control of only the local radio broadcast of
their home and away games. The league controls all other broadcasting rights, including
negotiation of the network television package. See Kurlantzick, Thoughts on Professional
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The club determines
ticket prices for its games and controls the
46
sale of concessions.
On the other hand, club activities are subject to collective
decisionmaking rules in several areas. Some decisions, such as
amendments to the constitution, club relocation, and league expansion, require the approval of a fixed proportion of the membership. 47 Other decisions, including negotiation of the league television contract, game scheduling, playing rules changes, and
arbitration of player-club disputes, are delegated to a league commissioner or some subset of the membership. 48 The league constitution, as the original agreement among the clubs, binds clubs to
decisions made pursuant to these established decisionmaking rules.
C. Financial Structure
The financial structure of professional sports leagues involves
both explicit and implicit economic interdependence among member clubs. The explicit interdependence takes the form of league
agreements to pool and share revenues. The implicit interdependence results from various non-financial league agreements that
shape the product of each club and thus affect each club's financial
success.
All sports leagues share revenues to some extent, although the
sources and proportion of shared revenues vary from league to
league. At least four kinds of revenue are shared in most leagues:
proceeds from the sale of broadcasting rights, fees paid by new
members of the league, gate receipts, and league merchandising
proceeds. This revenue sharing takes different forms for different
sources of revenue. The revenues from the league's network television contract, for example, are consolidated into a central fund
from which each club takes an equal share regardless of the frequency of its television appearances. 4 9 New members pay entrance
Sports and the Antitrust Laws: Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National
Football League, 15 CONN. L. REv. 183, 199 (1983); see also NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
CONST. art. X (1976); UNITED STATES FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONST. art. X, §§ 10.1-10.3 (1982).
48

See, e.g., Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 519 F. Supp. 581, 582

(C.D. Cal. 1981) (detailing autonomy of NFL clubs), af'd, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. NFL v. Oakland Raiders, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984).
47 See, e.g., NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONST. art. XXV, § 25.1(A) (1976) (amendment procedures).
48 See, e.g., id. art. VIII, § 8.9 (1976) (commissioner has "exclusive authority" to sell
national broadcasting rights); id. art. XIII, § 13.1 (commissioner's game schedule is binding
even without clubs' approval).
49 For descriptions of television revenue allocation in major league baseball, see INQUIRY INTO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, supra note 45, at 45-46; Chass, Shared Revenue a Key
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fees that are also shared equally among existing clubs. 50 The gate
receipts for a league game, however, are divided in unequal proportions between the clubs participating in the game.5 1 Because not all
revenues are shared, and because some shared revenues are divided
unequally, the degree of overall
explicit financial interdependence
52
league.
to
league
differs from
Issue, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1982, at A19, col. 1. Fpr the same in professional football, see
NATIONAL FooTBALL LEAGUE CONST. art X,

§

10.3 (1976); UNITED STATES FOOTBALL LEAGUE

CONsT. art. X, § 10.2 (1982); ProfessionalSports Antitrust Immunity: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 2784 and S. 2821, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1982)
(statement of Pete Rozelle, NFL Commissioner) [hereinafter cited as Professional Sports
Antitrust Immunity]. For professional hockey, see Antitrust Policy and Professional
Sports, supra note 37, at 666 (statement of John Ziegler, NHL President).
The network television contract provides a Significant source of revenue for many
leagues. In baseball, during the years 1975 to 197, approximately 13%, or $29 million, of
the leagues' annual revenue came from network bloadcasting revenues. J. MARKHAM & P.
TEPLrrz, supra note 36, at 44. That amount has increased substantially in recent years. See
Sports Has Become More Than a Game; It's Serious Business, L.A. Times, Mar. 29, 1983,
at III-1, col. 5 (new television contract to provide letween $900 million and $1 billion over
five years). At the same time, local pay television isl providing a source of increasing revenue
to individual clubs. See Baseball 1983, supra note 45, at 51 (sale of regional broadcasting
rights increased by 46% between 1982 and 1983).
In 1980, the average NFL team received 40% of its gross revenue from the league's
network broadcasting contracts. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, A SUMMARY OF NATIONAL
FOOTBALL LEAGUE ECONOMICS: 1970-1980, at 9 (1982) (profits included $5.5 million in television and radio revenues and $6.2 million in ticket sales). In 1984, USFL clubs each received
approximately $1 million, or about 40% of an average USFL club's operating expenses, from
the sale of the league's television package. See Pact Aids U.S.F.L. But More Is Needed,
N.Y. Times, June 24, 1984, at S7, col. 5.
For the 1981-82 season, only about 20% of the NBA's gross revenue came from network
television; close to 80% came from ticket sales. See Sports Has Become More Than a
Game, supra, at HII-1, col. 1.
" See Ferguson, An Accountant Profiles A Sports Franchise,MGMT. AccT., May 1979,
at 13, 14 (examples of NBA entrance fees); Football's Place Under the Sun, N.Y. Times,
July 1, 1984, § 6 (Magazine), at 19 (USFL clubs shared $31 million in expansion fees in
1983); cf. UNrrEn STATES FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONsT. art. III, § 3.3(c) (1982) (two-thirds of
clubs shall determine "franchise fee" for new entrants). Incumbent clubs also receive revenue from the sale of player contracts to the new club. See, e.g., NEW ENGLAND PATRIOTS
FOOTBALL CLUB, INC., 1975 ANNUAL REPORT 3.
" The proportion allocated to local and visiting teams varies from 60-40 in the NFL to

approximately 85-15 in major league baseball, with all proceeds going to the home team in
basketball and hockey. See Antitrust Policy and Professional Sports, supra note 45, at 666
(statement of John Ziegler, NHL President); INQUIRY INTO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, supra note
37, at 45. The USFL has recently changed from a 60-40 split to a flat fee arrangement, with
the visiting team taking $100,000 per game. Letter from Gary Kaplan, USFL counsel, to
James Brock (Jan. 4, 1985) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review) (explaining
amendment to UNITED STATES FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONST. art. XII, § 1 (1984)).
52 Approximately 97% of all NFL revenues are pooled for sharing. Professional Sports
Antitrust Immunity, supra note 49, at 34 (statememt of Pete Rozelle, NFL Commissioner).
Major league baseball earmarks about 12.5% of all revenues for sharing. J. MARKHAM & P.
TEPLITZ, supra note 36, at 46. The NBA shares no more than 20% percent of all league
revenues, since revenues from ticket sales, which account for 80% of the league's income,
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Clubs in a sports league also exhibit implicit financial interdependence because of collective decisions that determine the character of the league's product, and thus affect its attractiveness to
consumers. For example, league agreements prohibiting competitive bidding for players might prevent the gravitation of the best
talent to the richest clubs. These agreements effectively subsidize a
club's acquisition of new players and, by providing parity among
the teams, distribute gate receipts among all clubs.53 Competitive
balance on the playing field also increases overall revenues for the
clubs in the league by making contests less predictable and more
interesting to fans.5 4
Yet, even with both explicit and implicit economic interdependence, clubs within a sports league will achieve different financial
results because of variations in costs. Although the costs of operating the league organization (such as the commissioner's salary) are
shared equally,55 none of the substantial operating costs of the individual clubs is shared. The differences in operating costs among
the clubs create disparities in profits, despite the tendency of revenue sharing to equalize club revenues.58
This brief account of the structure of sports leagues illustrates
their unusual character. In some aspects of league business, the
member clubs work closely together to reach collective decisions,
and the clubs share the financial burden of those decisions in
roughly the same proportions. For other aspects of league business,
each club acts separately and .bears the financial consequences of

are kept by the home team. See Sports Has Become More Than a Game, supra note 49, at
HI-1, col 1. (estimating that unshared gate revenues account for 80% of all NBA revenues).
53 See H. DEMMERT, supra note 36, at 10-15; Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173,
1201 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (attributing
NFL success to "competitive balance" achieved "in large part" by player draft). But see

Quirk & Hodiri, The Economic Theory of a Sports League, in

GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS

BUSINESS, supra note 45, at 58 ("the rules structure of professional sports is relatively ineffective in balancing playing strengths"); Comment, Sport in Court: The Legality of Professional Football's System of Reserve and Compensation, 28 UCLA L. REv. 252, 285 n.216
(1980) (criticizing the competitive balance theory).
Collectively determined playing rules can also affect club revenues by making the
game more exciting and thus increasing fan interest. For example, narrower goalposts can
make football scores closer, the three-point play in basketball can lower average point
spreads, and the designated hitter in baseball can increase the number of base hits. See
generally BENJAMIN RADER, AMERICAN SPORTS: FROM THE AGE OF FOLK GAMES TO THE AGE OF
SPECTATORS (1983) (discussing game changes that enhanced the league product).
5 See, e.g., UNITED STATES FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONST. art. HI, § 3.10 (1982).
" See, e.g., A SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE ECONOMICS, supra note 49, at
13 (ranking NFL clubs on the basis of operating profit); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. NFL v. Oakland
Raiders, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984).
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its decisions. The dual nature of professional sports leagues makes
them especially hard to classify as unilateral or plural under the
Sherman Act. In some respects, they seem to stand as single entities; in other respects, they seem to be composed of a plurality of
separate actors.
III. A

CRITIQUE OF CURRENT APPROACHES TO
SPORTS LEAGUE PLURALITY

Some activities of professional sports leagues have been successfully challenged under section 1 of the Sherman Act, but few
courts have ruled explicitly on the applicability of the single-entity
defense. No case has addressed the issue since the Supreme
Court's decision in Copperweld. 7 The existing cases and commentary contain at least three distinct approaches to sports league plurality. First, some courts have held that the collective economic organization of a sports league never constitutes a single entity
immune from section 1. Second, some courts have argued that a
league should be considered a single entity only with regard to activities in which its clubs are not potential economic competitors.
Third, some commentators have suggested that professional sports
leagues should be considered the equivalent of a single firm for all
purposes under section 1. None of these approaches is consistent
with the Copperweld test.
A.

Leagues as Plural Entities

The Ninth and Second Circuits have rejected the single-entity
defense in different contexts. The Ninth Circuit case, Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL,58 involved a league rule
which barred the Oakland Raiders from moving to Los Angeles
without the approval of other clubs in the league. The Second Cir17 Most courts have subjected intraleague agreements to section 1 scrutiny without directly confronting the single-entity issue, thereby assuming, without actually deciding, that
sports leagues are plural entities. See, e.g., Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1147 (5th
Cir. 1977); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 616-18 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.
801 (1977); Linseman v. WHA, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (D. Conn. 1977); Kapp v. NFL, 390
F. Supp. 73, 80-82 (N.D. Cal. 1974), afi'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 907 (1979); United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 321 (E.D. Pa. 1953). An assumption of plurality was also implicit in the most recent Supreme Court case dealing with sports
leagues, where the Court condemned under section 1 the joint television plan of an amateur
football league. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
-8 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. NFL v. Oakland Raiders, 105 S. Ct.
397 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Raiders]. For a discussion of restrictions on club relocation,
see infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
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cuit case, NASL v. NFL,59 concerned an NFL rule prohibiting club
owners from investing in the clubs of another league. Without restricting the plurality determination to the context of the particular rule at issue, both courts held that the collective decisions of a
sports league are always concerted activity subject to section 1.60
The courts offered several reasons for holding that sports
league conduct is always plural. First, the Ninth Circuit pointed to
the "intraenterprise conspiracy" doctrine, which suggested that a
section 1 conspiracy can exist even between commonly owned corporations if they are distinct legal entities. 1 The court reasoned
that if common ownership does not preclude scrutiny under section 1, such scrutiny should not be precluded by the lesser affiliation of clubs in a sports league.6 2 Second, both the Second and
Ninth Circuits relied on prior cases holding that league restraints
on player-club negotiations violate section 1, inferring from those
decisions that leagues are subject to section 1 for all purposes. 3
Third, noting that the Supreme Court has applied section 1 to
other kinds of associations formed for the purpose of cooperative
production, both courts held that the cooperation among clubs
necessary to produce sporting events is not sufficient to characterize a league as a single entity.6 4 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit declared
that league organization is not even necessary to the product: because individual clubs could, in theory at least, produce games
59 670 F.2d 1249, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
60 Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1389-90; NASL, 670 F.2d at 1257-58. Several commentators

have reached the same conclusion. See Blecher & Daniels, Professional Sports and the
"Single Entity" Defense Under Section One of the Sherman Act, 4 WHITTIER L. REV. 217
(1982); Glick, ProfessionalSports FranchiseMovements and the Sherman Act: When and
Where Teams Should be Able to Move, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 55 (1983); Kurlantzick,
supra note 45, at 191; see also ProfessionalSports Antitrust Immunity, supra note 49, at
417-24 (prepared statement of Louis B. Schwartz). Some other commentators suggest that
section 1 scrutiny is appropriate but do not discuss the single-entity defense. See Leavell &
Millard, Trade Regulation and Professional Sports, 26 MERCER L. REV. 603 (1975); Comment, The SuperBowl and the Sherman Act: Professional Team Sports and the Antitrust
Laws, 81 HARv. L. REV. 418 (1967).
"1See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
62 Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1388.
63 Id.; NASL, 670 F.2d at 1257.
64 Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1388; NASL, 670 F.2d at 1257. The cases cited by the courts
include Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (association of music composers
formed for the purpose of selling blanket license for all member compositions); United
States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (cooperative of regional mattress manufacturers
formed for the purpose of licensing a national trademark); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (cooperative of newspapers formed for the purpose of sharing
news). For a critique of the Ninth Circuit's use of these cases, see Weistart, League Control
of Market Opportunities: A Perspective on Competition and Cooperation in the Sports
Industry, 1984 DuKE L.J. 1013, 1055-60.
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through some form of cooperation other than'6 5 membership in a
league, their product has "independent value.
Copperweld completely undermines this approach. To begin
with, the Supreme Court rejected a "legal entities" approach to
plurality under section 1, thus eliminating the basis for the Ninth
Circuit's analogy to the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine. 6 By
offering a new plurality test, Copperweld also casts doubt on any
inferences from the prior sports league cases that confronted the
plurality issue only indirectly. Furthermore, Copperweld uses the
substantive economic interests of the cooperating parties as the
crucial factor in determining plurality, not the necessity of their
cooperation in the production process.
B. The Potential Economic Competition Test
The second approach to sports league plurality equates the absence of potential economic competition among league clubs with
an absence of section 1 plurality.6 7 Under this approach, a collec65The court explained that while "cooperation is necessary to produce a football game
. . .this does not mean 'that each club can produce football games only as a member of the
NFL.'" Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1390 (quoting Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v.
NFL, 519 F. Supp. 581, 584 (C.D. Cal. 1981)). However, the court's statement that individual club matches have independent value is true only to a limited extent, for it ignores the
fact that the procession toward a league championship tremendously augments the value of
each match as an individual product. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
66 A recent commentator has argued that Copperweld validates the blanket rejection of
the single-entity defense used by the Ninth and Second Circuits. See Lazaroff, The Antitrust Implications of FranchiseRelocation Restrictions, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 157, 163-69
(1984). Lazaroff argues that separate ownership and "differen[ces in] attitude" that exist
between clubs imply that leagues fall the Copperweld test. Id. at 167. But see Roberts,
supra note 33, at 250-54 (arguing that Copperweld immunizes some league activities). However, Lazaroff's approach fails to recognize that the degree of unity of interest among clubs
will vary for different aspects of league operations. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying
text.
,. See NASL v. NFL, 505 F. Supp. 659, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982); San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v.
NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966, 969-70 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1406 (Williams, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). One district court has used the potential competition approach to reject the single-entity defense with respect to an intraleague agreement
regulating activities involving significant competition among clubs. In Robertson v. NBA, 67
F.R.D. 691, 694 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the court held that the NBA's player draft and reserve
rules were subject to section 1 scrutiny because they involved league activities in markets
within which clubs were competitors. Because the league's clubs compete for player services,
the court reasoned, there was potential for anticompetitive activity.
Potential competition figures heavily in the approaches of many commentators as well.
See, e.g., J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 44, at 701 (franchise relocation decisions
should be immune from section 1 because clubs are not "true economic competitors");
Blecher & Daniels, supra note 60, at 238 (no single-entity status because clubs in same area
"compete vigorously").
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tive decision is considered plural when it relates to an area of potential economic competition among individual clubs. A collective
decision is considered unilateral when it relates to matters where
the potential for competition is lacking."
Two federal district courts used this approach when faced
with the same kinds of league practices for which the Second and
Ninth Circuits found the single-entity defense inappropriate: restraints on territorial relocation' 9 and limits on interleague investment.7 0 The district courts first defined the market affected by the
challenged league rule, then determined whether the marketwas
"8The existence of potential economic competition between clubs in a sports league
has been a recurring theme elsewhere in the antitrust jurisprudence of the industry and has
been an issue in two contexts: first, in deciding whether traditional rules of illegality for
horizontal agreements between competitors can be applied to sports leagues; and second, in
determining whether league decisions restricting league membership are incapable of anticompetitive effect and thus cannot violate section 1 even under a reasonableness standard.
In the first context, some courts have held that the per se prohibition against group
boycotts under section 1 does not apply to sports leagues because clubs are not potential
economic competitors. See Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Kapp v.
NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 907 (1979). They reasoned that although a group boycott among clubs as competitors
would be inherently anticompetitive, among clubs as noncompetitors it might have procompetitive effects. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1180-81; Mackey, 543 F.2d at 619; Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at
82. But see Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(applying per se rule to an NBA player negotiation rule).
The potential economic competition approach also has been used successfully to argue
that league actions restricting membership are incapable of restricting competition and thus
do not violate section 1 under any standard. Two courts have rejected section 1 challenges
to league decisions denying applications for membership in the league. Mid-South Grizzlies
v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983) (newly organized club denied NFL franchise), cert.
denied, 104 S.Ct. 2657 (1984); Levin v. NBA, 385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (NBA
refusal to approve sale of franchise). Both courts noted that in applying to join the league,
the plaintiffs did not seek to compete with clubs in the league, but to join them in the
business of producing professional sport. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 785; Levin, 385 F. Supp. at
152. The Levin court reasoned that denial of a franchise thus could not prevent any competition that would have existed otherwise. 385 F. Supp. at 151-52. In contrast, the Third
Circuit in Grizzlies recognized that economic competition between members of the NFL is
possible, as, for example, when clubs compete for fan revenue in shared territories. 720 F.2d
at 787. However, because the particular applicant in Grizzlies would not have been geographically capable of competing with other NFL clubs for fan revenue, its exclusion from
the league did not have the effect of restraining economic competition. Id. at 786-87.
" See San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966, 969-70 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
Seals differed from the Raiders case, though, because the club challenging the territorial
restriction in Seals sought to move to a location not already occupied by another league
club. In Raiders, the club desired to relocate to an already occupied area. This distinction is
critical under the test proposed in Part IV of this comment. See infra notes 95-99 and
accompanying text.
70 See NASL v. NFL, 505 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
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one in which the league clubs could be economic competitors. Because the courts determined that clubs within a single league could
not be economic competitors within the identified market, the
league actions were characterized as unilateral. For example, one
court found that the market relevant to a rule prohibiting a hockey
franchise relocation was the national market for professional
hockey games before live audiences. The court determined that
clubs within a league do not compete economically with each other
in that market. Rather, the clubs within a league act as a unit in
competition with other sports leagues. The clubs in the hockey
league thus were "acting together as one single business
1
enterprise. '
Although the inquiry into potential economic competition
might often lead to results consistent with the Copperweld test, it
differs in both its focus and its results. The potential competition
test focuses predominantly on market definition. Judges must examine the market actually affected by the challenged practice and
can find single-entity status only in those markets where potential
competition does not exist. Defining the appropriate product market is often an extremely difficult undertaking, however, especially
where unconventional products such as sporting events are involved.72 Moreover, Copperweld says that the plurality determina-

71 Seals, 379 F. Supp. at 969. The court noted that the club challenging the restraint
expected to remain a member of the league following its relocation. However, only by withdrawing from the league would that club place itself in a position of economic competition
with the league members. Id. The league rule, of course, imposed no restraints on the relocation of clubs that chose to withdraw from the league.
7' To illustrate the difficulty of market definition, consider the distinction drawn by
one dissenting appellate court judge between "downstream" and "upstream" activities. See
Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1406 (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Upstream" activities are those in which clubs are bidders for inputs to production, such as
player services. "Downstream" activities are those taking place at the end of the production
process, in which clubs sell the league product. In upstream markets clubs have "significant
identities" apart from the rest of the league and they compete directly for production inputs. However, clubs do not compete in downstream markets, according to this view, because the joint nature of the league's product creates an interdependence among clubs that
is inconsistent with economic rivalry. Id.; see also J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLrrZ, supra note 36,
at 13 (arguing that there is less potential for competition among clubs in output markets
than in input markets); J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 44, at 702 (same).
As a tool for isolating potentially competitive sports markets, the "upstream/downstream" approach gives inconsistent results. For example, the sale of tickets and concession
items is clearly a downstream activity insofar as it involves league "output," yet two clubs in
geographical proximity will probably compete for fan revenue. See Raiders, 726 F.2d at
1390; NASL, 505 F. Supp. at 666. The sale of network broadcasting rights is also a downstream activity, but in the absence of an intraleague agreement for joint negotiation of a
network contract, individual clubs would probably compete vigorously for television revenues. On the other hand, the solicitation of investment capital is clearly an upstream activ-
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tion depends on the nature of the economic relationship between
the cooperating parties, not on the limits of the markets for particular products.
In addition, the results of this approach are only partly consistent with Copperweld. Although the potential for competition between parties may indicate that they have different economic interests, the absence of potential competition does not signify their
unity of economic interest. Copperweld's definition of plurality as
the "sudden joining of economic resources that had previously
served different interests ' 73 cannot be read to mean that plurality
exists only where the parties could be competitors. 74 Such a definition of plurality would be inconsistent with a vast number of section 1 cases scrutinizing agreements between parties that could
only loosely be described as potential competitors, especially in the
field of vertical restraints.7" Indeed, Copperweld itself endorsed a
finding of plurality in a vertical agreement between a manufacturer
76
and its distributor.
C.

Leagues as Single Entities

A third approach to sports league plurality, which some commentators endorse, finds leagues to be single entities for all purposes relating to the production of sports matches.7 7 Under this

ity, yet at least one court has taken the view that individual clubs within a league do not
compete with each other for such capital. NASL, 505 F. Supp. at 666, 684-85.
73 Copperweld, 104 S.Ct. at 2742.
71 At least one appellate court, however, has used a potential competition approach
even after Copperweld. In Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 1777 (1985), a doctor challenged the decision of a hospital's medical staff to deny
him hospital privileges. The court found that the staff's decision constituted concerted conduct because the individual doctors on the staff were capable of competing with each other.
Id. at 813-16. On the other hand, the staff and the hospital were not considered entities
capable of conspiring with each other because they had no interest in competition with each
other. Id. at 817.
71 For example, the Supreme Court has evaluated resale price maintenance agreements
and tying arrangements under section 1 despite the fact that such agreements typically bind
economic actors at different levels of the production and distribution process. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (resale
price maintenance agreement); Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S.
495 (1969) (tying arrangement).
76 104 S. Ct. at 2739.
7 See R. BORK, supra note 24, at 278-79; Grauer, Recognition of the NationalFootball
League as a Single Entity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MIcH. L. REv. 1 (1983); see also Bork, Resolved: Present Antitrust
Restraints on PricingShould Be Relaxed, 41 ANTITRUST L.J. 5, 13 (1971); Kempf, The Misapplicationof Antitrust Law to Professional Sports Leagues, 32 DE PAUL L. REv. 625, 62831 (1983). The "potential economic competition" and "essential agreement" tests are not
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approach, agreements between separate firms engaged in cooperative production of a single product should be completely legal if
the product cannot be produced without such contractual integration.78 This approach begins with the premise that "the only legitimate goal of antitrust is the maximization of consumer welfare";7 9
in other words, all economic activity that promotes consumer welfare should be lawful. Agreements that are essential to creating a
new product cannot reduce the economic efficiency of production,
since by definition the production is impossible without them. As a
result, they do not reduce consumer welfare. According to this
view, because cooperation among clubs is essential to their productive activity, sports leagues are examples of "essential" contractual
integration between firms. Thus, they should always be considered
single entities for section 1 purposes.8 0
Although Copperweld's plurality test emphasizes the efficiency
associated with a firm's ability to structure its internal affairs, the
Court did not adopt a pure efficiency approach like the "essential
agreement" test. The Court looked to the existence of unity of economic interest among the parties to that conduct, and not to the
cooperation necessary for production.
mutually exclusive. Some commentators have relied upon both rationales simultaneously.
See, e.g., J. WEisTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 44, § 5.11(a)(1); Roberts, supra note 33, at
251-52. The arguments are closely related. Financial interdependence may be an "essential
feature" of league sports, since leagues need competitive balance in talent. Interdependence
reduces the possibility of economic competition among clubs, since competition could
weaken or destroy the on-field competitive balance.
7s The district court in NASL, 505 F. Supp. at 666, relied in part on an "essential
agreements" rationale for its holding that the NFL is a single entity. The court stated that:
[the] single economic entity concept finds some support in the [notion] that joint activity, inherently necessary to produce a marketable ... product, creates a single, "separate seller" of that product ....
[A] professional sports team cannot play or market
itself. The sports league's product can exist only as the result of joint effort. In that
context, I conclude that there is no combination in restraint of trade ....
505 F. Supp. at 688 (emphasis in original). The court does not seem to have recognized that
this rationale is at odds with the potential competition rationale it espouses elsewhere in the
opinion. See id. at 677. Under the potential competition approach, a sports league is a single
entity only with respect to those aspects of its operation which do not involve interclub
economic competition. Under the essential agreements approach, on the other hand, a
sports league is a single entity for all activities necessary for producing the league product.
The district courts in NASL and Seals also used "essential agreement" rhetoric to distinguish intraenterprise conspiracy cases from sports league arrangements. NASL, 505 F.
Supp. at 688; Seals, 379 F. Supp. at 970. Their use of the concept is much more limited than
the "essential agreement" test described here, insofar as the district courts did not hold that
plurality was lacking in league agreements solely because the agreements were intrinsic to
league production.
79 R. BORK, supra note 24, at 7.
80 See id. at 278-79; Grauer, supra note 77, at 19; cf. supra note 65 (considering
whether individual club matches have independent value).
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Furthermore, the "essential agreement" test is unworkable because no adequate standard exists for determining which sports
league agreements are essential to league production. Some agreements may appear necessary to enhancing output, when in fact
they lead to considerable inefficiencies. For example, an agreement
that restricts the ability of players to negotiate with clubs enhances club revenue and stabilizes the distribution of playing talent among clubs. In this sense, it might be essential to league production. But to the extent clubs exert cartel power in the player
services market, the agreement creates social costs. 8 ' The "essential agreement" approach could be applied with any confidence
only after first inquiring about the minimum degree of restriction
needed to maintain league survival without excessive social costs.
Consequently, this approach would make the threshold plurality
test as complicated as the merits of the antitrust claim.
The "essential agreement" standard also conflicts with Copperweld's specific reservation of section 1 scrutiny for challenges to
business practices that involve contracts between the defendant
firm and third parties. In these situations, section 1 plurality always exists on the basis of the contract. 82 Sports leagues would always be susceptible to section 1 attack on the basis of contracts
with players,8 3 television networks, or stadium owners."4 Under the
"essential agreement" approach, however, a contract with a third
party could be treated as unilateral action, exempt from section 1
scrutiny, if it is "essential" to production. Contracts with players
might also fall into this category. 5
81 See R. LEFTWICH & R. ECKERT, supra note 30, at 461, 475-85 (discussing social costs
of monopsony in professional baseball).
82 The Court explained that the existence of such contracts in prior cases finding conspiracy between commonly owned firms could have provided plurality even without the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine. For example, in one case finding a resale price-fixing conspiracy between two commonly owned subsidiaries, the Court observed that even if plurality
was not found between the subsidiaries, the involvement of wholesalers who purchased from
them made the price-fixing scheme concerted and subject to section 1. Copperweld, 104 S.
Ct. at 2738 n.9 (citing Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149-50 & n.6 (1968)).
83 See supra note 44 (describing player restraints). League constitutions usually contain a covenant among the clubs that they will include "in every contract between any member club and its employees, including coaches and players, a clause in which the parties to
the contract agree to be bound by the Constitution and By-Laws of the League." UNITED
STATES FOoTBALL LEAGUE CONsT. art. III, § 3.11(d) (1982). Arguably, then, players become
third parties to all league covenants controlling player relations, and are able to challenge
those covenants as concerted activity under section 1.
84 Such contracts are being challenged in a pending antitrust suit brought by the USFL
against the NFL. See Attorneys Discuss Aspects of U.S.F.L. Suit Against N.F.L., N.Y.
Times, Oct. 21, 1984, § 5, at 12, col. 1.
15See Grauer, supra note 77, at 40-41 (because the NFL is a single entity "any re-
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NEw APPROACH TO SPORTS LEAGUE PLURALITY

The three approaches to sports league plurality outlined in the
previous section cannot survive the Supreme Court's decision in
Copperweld. The Court's new test is more closely linked to the
aims of a plurality determination: cooperating parties are consolidated as one or cleaved into many, depending on whether the parties exhibit a unity of economic interest. And as noted previously,
parties to a joint enterprise will exhibit unity of economic interest
when collective decisions are made pursuant to a preexisting arrangement which allocates the economic effects of the decisions in
fixed proportions among the parties.
A.

Sports Leagues Under the Copperweld Test

When the Copperweld test is applied to sports leagues, it is
clear which league activities should be considered unilateral and
which should be considered concerted for section 1 purposes.
League activities are unilateral when they bear primarily on revenues which intraleague agreements distribute in fixed proportions
among clubs and when they bear only slightly or not at all on each
club's independent costs. Only this kind of coordinated conduct
will have a predictably uniform effect on the profits of the member
clubs, giving each club the same incentive to maximize the overall
profits of the league.8 6 Because clubs have substantial unity of ecostraint on the player market caused by the draft" is legal). The problem of third-party
contracts appears to have been ignored by some commentators, particularly those who advocate the single-entity defense with regard to player-league disputes. See id.; Note, The
N.F.L.'s Final Victory Over Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc.: Single Entity-Interleague Economic Analysis, 21 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 541 (1978). But see J. WEIsTART & C. LOWELL, supra
note 44, at 693 (section 1 applies where league "joins with outsiders" to restrain
competition).
8' See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text. The initial league agreement setting
forth revenue-sharing provisions, which establishes unity of economic interest among league
members, will always constitute plural action subject to section 1 challenge as a "merger" of
previously separate economic entities. Nonetheless, a plaintiff could not use a merger theory
to attack a single-entity action of the league. A claim that revenue-sharing provisions constitute an anticompetitive "merger" would bring into question only the competitive effect of
the merger itself, and not the effect of decisions relating to revenue made after clubs
merged, so long as the proportional allocation of revenues among clubs remains stable.
For example, a frustrated applicant for membership in the league who desired a
franchise in an unoccupied territory could not challenge the expansion decision under section 1 because the league acts as a single entity with regard to such decisions. See infra
notes 100-03 and accompanying text. The plaintiff could instead challenge the league's revenue-sharing agreement itself as an unlawful merger between clubs, but this claim would be
wholly different from a group boycott claim against the league's decision not to expand.
A merger challenge itself is unlikely to be successful for two reasons. First, the major
revenue-sharing agreements within leagues-those covering network television reve-
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nomic interest on these matters, under the Copperweld approach
collective decisions about such conduct should be considered unilateral and exempt from scrutiny under section 1.87
On the other hand, sports leagues do not exhibit unity of economic interest when collective decisions bear significantly on costs,
on revenues that are shared in variable proportions, or on revenues
that are not shared at all. In these areas, the member clubs have
disparate economic interests in the results of their collective decisions. Where unity of interest is lacking, the clubs are not operating in a manner resembling a traditional partnership or joint venture, so plurality is present. Thus, under the proposed Copperweld
approach, such league practices should remain subject to section 1
scrutiny.
One example of unilateral league action is a joint decision
about television broadcasting. Most leagues exhibit unity of economic interest with respect to television revenues, which have little
effect on costs and are shared equally among the member clubs. 8
Because each club's share of television revenues is fixed in proportion, member clubs have identical incentives to maximize these
revenues.8 9 In contrast, local merchandising receipts typically are
not shared at all. Here, collective action should be treated as plural
because each club has special economic interests which differ from
the interests of other clubs. Although these examples are straightforward, some others are more complicated and are worth considering as further illustrations of the Copperweld test.

nues-have been immunized from section 1 by special legislation. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291
(1982). Second, a section 1 challenge to league revenue sharing in and of itself is likely to
fail on the merits. Revenue-sharing agreements in sports leagues have important procompetitive effects insofar as they contribute to league stability. A number of courts have admitted that the need to maintain a balance of playing talent among clubs could be a valid basis
for restrictive league agreements. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323-24 (E.D.
Pa. 1953).
87 Cf. Roberts, supra note 33, at 296-97 (arguing that section I applies to sports
leagues
only where the decision challenged was made by a small minority of clubs motivated by
"independent economic interests" conflicting with those of the "league as a whole").
88 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
89 For example, the NBA recently renegotiated its network and cable television contracts. See Basketball: Business is Booming, Bus. WK., Oct. 28, 1985, at 73, 82. By reducing
the number of games televised over cable and regional systems from 170 to 75, the league
hopes to eliminate oversaturation and increase the value of its network broadcasts. Id. The
equal division of television revenues among clubs gives each club an interest in maximizing
the league's total revenues from all television broadcasts-network and cable. If clubs did
not share the revenues from their own cable broadcasts, no club would have an incentive to
select a mix of network and cable broadcasts that would be optimal for all clubs.
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Applications for Specific League Decisions

When a league decision or agreement is challenged, the determination of whether it constitutes unilateral or plural conduct
must proceed through three steps. The first step is to identify the
league's economic activities that are affected by the decision. The
second step is to determine whether the clubs in the league exhibit
a preexistent unity of economic interest in those activities. If unity
of interest is found, the decision should be treated as unilateral. If
the decision affects some areas of activity where unity of interest is
lacking, however, a third step is required to judge whether the effect on such activities is significant enough to warrant the conclusion that the league decision constitutes plural conduct. When the
league decision has more than a minimal impact on activities in
which the clubs have divergent interests, it should be treated as
plural conduct because the clubs will no longer have unity of interest in its consequences. To show how this three-step inquiry works
in practice, this discussion examines three kinds of agreements
among clubs within a professional sports league: playing rules, territorial restrictions on club movement, and restrictions on league
expansion.
1. PlayingRules. A league's playing rules provide the consistency necessary for a meaningful championship race and determine
the character of a league's product. Leagues make decisions about
playing rules in committees" or by membership vote.91 These collective decisions may be subject to antitrust challenge. For example, players could assert that a certain rule effectively makes them
unable to sell their services to the league, thus amounting to a
group boycott.9 2 However, application of the Copperweld approach
suggests that decisions about rules should always be considered
unilateral.
To demonstrate this, assume initially that a league constitution establishes perfect revenue sharing: all club revenues, including ticket sales, broadcast sales, and miscellaneous income are
pooled and divided among the clubs in fixed proportions.9 With
90 See J. MARKHAM

& P. TEPLrrz, supra note 36, at 43 (discussing baseball playing rules

committee).
91 See, e.g., UNrrED STATES FooTBALL LEAGUE CONST. art. XI, § 11.2 (1982).
" See, e.g., Neeld v. NHL, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979) (challenging the NHL's prohibition of one-eyed players); Linseman v. WHA, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977) (challenging age requirements).
13 It is not necessary for unity of economic interest that revenues be divided equally, so
long as they are divided according to proportions that are fixed during the period at issue.
See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
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such an agreement, clubs voting on a rule change will exhibit a
unity of economic interest: the clubs will seek to devise rules that
maximize total league revenues since they will benefit proportionally from increased revenues. Playing rules primarily affect fan interest in the sport, which reveals itself as revenue. In a league with
perfect revenue sharing, clubs will act like a single firm by selecting playing rules that maximize revenue. Hence, a league's rules
decisions should be treated as unilateral conduct.
If the revenue-sharing assumption is relaxed, the interests of
clubs will diverge only slightly. The effect of a rule change on each
club's costs continues to be negligible. As for revenues, substantial
non-uniform effects on clubs are possible but unlikely, since playing rules have an across-the-board effect on consumer demand.
Even if some clubs benefit more than others, this effect will be unpredictable, and will create at most a minimal divergence of interests at the time of the decision. 4 Thus, Copperweld suggests that
the conduct should still be treated as unilateral, since the rules decisions have only a minimal impact on activities in which the clubs
have divergent interests, but have a strong impact on an area of
shared interest: the league product itself.
2. Relocation Restrictions. All leagues establish territorial restrictions on the location of their clubs. Usually, the league constitution establishes the geographical area in which a member club
has the exclusive right to present games, and clubs are prohibited
from relocating outside of this area without the approval of some
proportion of the league membership. 5 A relocation restriction
14 For example, a playing rule might be proposed that would give
a club an immediate
and substantial edge as an on-field competitor. Thus, a football club with excellent kickers
might want a rule narrowing football goalposts whereas a club with poor kickers would not.
Because on-field superiority implies greater financial success for a club, see supra note 36, in
the short run clubs could have divergent financial interests in such a rule. Over time, however, this divergence will disappear.
11 In major league baseball, the National League establishes the exclusive area of each
club as the city limits of the franchise's location plus ten miles in all directions. The American League establishes it as the one hundred mile radius around the club's park. Within this
area no other club of the same league may locate. A club may locate its franchise in a city
already occupied by a club of the other league so long as its playing field is at least five
miles from that of the incumbent club. Furthermore, if the city has a population of less than
2.4 million, three-quarters of the clubs in the incumbent club's league must approve the
relocation decision. See J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLITZ, supra note 36, at 3.
In football, the NFL establishes a club's exclusive territory as the city in which it is
located plus seventy-five miles in all directions. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONST. art. IV,
§ 4.1 (1976). The USFL establishes it merely as "the area in which the club is located and

for which it holds a franchise and plays its home games."

UNITED STATES FOOTBALL LEAGUE

art. IV, § 4.1 (1982). Formerly, both the NFL and USFL constitutions prevented
relocation of any franchise without the approval of three-quarters of the league memberCONsT.
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rule could be challenged under the Sherman Act in several ways. A
club could allege that such a rule restrains competition from clubs
that might otherwise occupy the same territory.96 Also, stadium
operators might conceivably challenge such a rule as a group
boycott

7

Under the proposed Copperweld analysis, league denial of a
club's relocation cannot be considered the action of a single entity
because the relocation decision implicates significantly different
economic interests among the various clubs, even if the league
agreement provides for perfect revenue sharing. The divergence of
ship. NATIONAL FooTBALL LEAGUE CONST. art. IV, § 4.3 (1976); UNITED STATES FOOTBALL
LEAGUE CONST. art. IV, § 4.3 (1982) (also requiring the assent of "any member club whose
home territory would be affected" by the move). The NFL provision was ruled a violation of
section 1 in Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1401. Shortly thereafter, the NFL Commissioner established criteria to govern the vote on relocation. Memorandum from Pete Rozelle to NFL
Club Presidents (Dec. 21, 1984), reprinted in Professional Sports Community Protection
Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 259 and S. 287 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation,99th Cong., 1st Sess. 69-71 (1985) (statement of Pete Rozelle).
In basketball, requests for relocation are considered by a committee of five of the
league's club owners, and the committee's decision to allow relocation must then be ratified
by a majority of the league's clubs. See, e.g., NBA Group OKs Kings' Move West, Chicago
Tribune, Apr. 4, 1985, at IV-i, col. 1. Relocation to a territory already occupied by an NBA
team also requires the approval of the club presently in the area. See Kurlantzick, supra
note 45, at 184 n.4.
In hockey, the NHL defines each club's exclusive area as the city in which it is located
and the surrounding fifty-mile radius. See Note, Antitrust Analysis in ProfessionalSports
Management Cases: The Public Cries "Foul!" 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 995, 1001 n.29 (1983). Transfers of location require the unanimous consent of the NHL membership. See Kurlantzick,
supra note 45, at 184 n.4.
98 Analysts disagree whether clubs sharing the same metropolitan area compete for live
attendance. Compare Noll, Attendance and Price Setting, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS
BUSINESS, supra note 45, at 154 (exclusive territorial rights restrict competition in large cities) and Blecher & Daniels, supra note 60, at 232 (clubs in the same area compete) with J.
MARKHAM & P. TEPLrrz, supra note 36, at 24 (price elasticity of demand for games played in
different home parks within the same city is extremely low).
Several aspects of existing league agreements support the former position. The USFL
and NBA constitutions prohibit a club from relocating to an already occupied territory
without the assent of the incumbent club. See supra note 95. And in the baseball leagues
each club has the right to prevent unauthorized broadcasts by other clubs into its own territory. See supra note 45. Also, baseball schedules are designed to minimize the number of
times that clubs in the same city play home games on the same day. See CHICAGO NATIONAL
LEAGUE BALL CLUB, 1980 FORM 10-K ANNUAL REPORT, pt. 1, item 1. If there were no potential for competition between clubs in the same geographical area, these rules would be
unnecessary.
W The stadium operators' theory would be that a relocation rule restricts competition
among clubs for the purchase of their services. Stadium operators may also be able to challenge relocation rules under other theories. In Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1393-94, the Los Angeles
Coliseum claimed that the NFL's relocation rule operated to restrain competition among
stadiums to obtain football clubs as tenants. In effect, the Coliseum seems to have been
alleging that the NFL rule operated to create a cartel among stadiums, of which it was an
unwilling member.
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interests exists because the relocation decision affects each club's
costs differently.
An example demonstrates this divergence of interests. Imagine
that club A proposes to move from its present location to a city
presently unoccupied by another club. The other clubs in the
league should approve the move if it will result in a net increase in
total league revenues.98 Such an increase might come from increased ticket sales in the new location, for example. On the other
hand, club A's decision to move is based on more than a desire to
increase gross revenues: club A wishes to maximize its profits.
Thus, it will desire relocation when its share of league revenues in
the new city minus its costs in the new city exceed its share of the
league revenues in the old city minus its costs there. A club will
prefer relocation, despite the league's opposition, in those situations where the cost savings of relocation exceed any loss in its
99

revenue.

Where club A seeks to relocate into territory already occupied
by club B, the disparity of interests may be even more pronounced.
Again, the other clubs in the league should approve the move if it
will result in a net increase in total league revenues. However, B
may oppose the move because its costs may be increased by A's
intrusion; in this situation, both A and B have interests that are
distinct from those of the other clubs.
If a significant fraction of league revenues are not shared in
consistent proportions, the interests of the various clubs diverge
even further. Even if television revenues are equally shared, gate
receipts may be unequally shared between the home and visiting
teams. When A proposes to move into B's territory, the other clubs
still look only at the net effect of the move on shared revenues. If
98 This decision becomes more complicated when the effect of the move on future expansion proceeds is taken into account. If the city to which club A wants to relocate is a
potential market for a new team, then the potential net gains from expansion-the expansion fees which are equally shared-become a factor weighing against allowing relocation. In
fact, the loss of future expected expansion proceeds may have figured in the NFL vote to
prohibit the Oakland Raiders from moving to Los Angeles. See Professional Sports Antitrust Immunity, supra note 49, at 209 (testimony of Pete Rozelle, NFL Commissioner, in
district court).
99 The importance of costs in the club's location decision is demonstrated by the substantial amount of bidding among municipalities for professional sports franchises. Quite
often cities attempt to lure teams with favorable lease terms, new facilities, and the like. See
Cities Play Hardball to Lure Teams, L.A. Times, June 30, 1984, at I-1, col. 1; At Whose-ier
Dome and Elsewhere, the Stakes Keep Getting Higher, Wash. Post, July 11, 1983, at D1,
col. 4. Indeed, a favorable loan deal may have influenced the Oakland Raiders' 1982 move to
Los Angeles. See Raiders-L.A.'s in the Black With A Silver Lining, L.A. Times, June 30,
1984, at 1-22, col. 1.
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the other clubs expect to share lower gate receipts when they play
at A's or B's location (because A and B may compete for fans),
they would prefer that A remain where it is. Club B might have
more reason to oppose the move than does the rest of the league if
A's intrusion reduces B's local revenues by more than it increases
B's share of pooled revenues. In making its decision, club A also
continues to look at more than pooled revenues: even if costs remain constant, A will desire to move if its expected increase in
unshared revenues exceeds any decrease in its share of pooled
revenues.
Each of these examples demonstrates a divergence of interests
and suggests that professional sports leagues should not be considered single entities under section 1 with regard to challenges to
league territorial restraints. Regardless of the degree to which a
league shares revenues, this conclusion holds insofar as individual
clubs do not uniformly bear the costs of the relocation decisions.
Furthermore, if the relocation decision affects revenues that are
not shared in fixed proportions, the divergence of interest among
the clubs increases.
3. New Franchise Restrictions. All league constitutions establish a decision rule for the entry of new clubs into the league,
usually by requiring the approval of a large proportion of the
membership. 100 Unsuccessful applicants have challenged such
agreements as concerted refusals to deal that restrain potential economic competition among clubs. 10 ' Conceivably, consumers or
municipalities could challenge the rule on the same grounds, alleging that it restricts league output and raises prices.
The analysis here tracks the analysis of relocation restrictions.
The creation of a new franchise in an unoccupied territory should
have no significant effect on the costs experienced by incumbent
members of the league. Whether unity of economic interest exists
will therefore depend on whether the franchise decision primarily
affects revenues that are shared in consistent proportions. Under
an initial assumption of perfect revenue sharing, all clubs have
identical interests because expansion affects only the revenues of
existing clubs and not their costs. They will vote for expansion if
collectively they perceive that the added revenues from expansion
200 See, e.g., NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONST. art III,§ 3.1(b) (1976) (admission of
new members requires approval of three-fourths of league members); UNITED STATES FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONST. art. III, § 3.1(b) (1982) (same).
102See, e.g., Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 2657 (1984).
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(more games, a more exciting playoff race, and entrance fees paid
by the new club) will outweigh the decrease in revenues associated
with expansion (lower shared revenues by virtue of more sharing
clubs, degradation of playing quality from the dilution of playing
talent, and relatively lower shared ticket revenues from games
played against the new team). In these circumstances, the clubs
display a unity of economic interest in a decision to create a new
franchise, and their decision should be treated as that of a single
entity.
If the new franchise would be located in an area already occupied by another club, however, unity of economic interest breaks
down. Under perfect revenue sharing, the incumbent club experiences no effect on revenue peculiar to that club, but it may have
special cost concerns. 0 2 If these are so minimal as to be insignificant, then the league remains a single entity for Sherman Act purposes. As they become more significant, the interests of league
members diverge, rendering the location decision plural under the
Copperweld test.
When the assumption of perfect revenue sharing is relaxed, divergence of interest increases further. Assume that new franchise
fees and television revenues are shared equally among the members of the league, gate receipts are unequally shared between the
home and visiting teams, and merchandising receipts are retained
by the home team. The primary effect of the decision to admit a
new franchise will be on the equally shared revenues. The existing
teams have relatively similar interests in gate receipts from the
new franchise because all of them, as visiting teams, will take the
0 3 Thus, if the new
same proportion of those receipts."
franchise will
be located in an unoccupied area, the league decision is that of a
single entity.
If another team is already occupying the area, however, the
relative interests of the clubs diverge as they do in a relocation
decision. The incumbent club may expect lower revenues and possibly higher costs after the intrusion of a new club, while these effects will not matter to the other clubs. For this reason, a league
decision about expanding into an already occupied territory should
"02 For example, clubs may bid for local inputs to production, such as stadium facilities, meaning that the presence of another club in the same city could increase the incumbent club's costs by decreasing his monopsony power.
103 However, existing clubs may have distinct interests in deciding whether the league
should expand because expansion may require them to sell player contracts to the new club.
The perceived costs and revenues associated with those transactions might be quite different among clubs.
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not be considered the action of a single entity. But, if the league
shares local revenues to such an extent that the effect on the incumbent club's revenues is imperceptible, and if the new franchise
does not impose significant costs on the incumbent club, the league
decision about expansion should still be considered unilateral and
thus exempt from section 1.
CONCLUSION

Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. stands for an
approach to the plurality requirement of section 1 that depends
upon the substantive economic interests of the parties to cooperative activity. If the parties have unity of economic interest with
regard to the activity, as do a parent corporation and its wholly
owned subsidiary, Copperweld prescribes that it is in the interest
of competition to consider the activity unilateral and thus protected from section 1 challenge. This comment has argued that,
even without common ownership, unity of interest may exist when
the parties have agreed to share proportionally in the gains and
losses of their concerted activity. It is both consistent with Copperweld and in the interest of competition to exempt from section
I liability the actions of groups whose relationship is governed by
such agreements.
An examination of professional sports leagues demonstrates
that this principle works to protect some aspects of league operations from section 1 scrutiny. More specifically, those aspects of
league operations in which the members of a league make collective decisions which operate on revenues that are shared in fixed
proportions, and not on unshared costs, should be exempt from
section 1. All other agreements among clubs should be treated as
concerted conduct subject to challenge under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
James L. Brock, Jr.

